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Abstract: Jordan has weathered a number of political challenges inspired by the Arab Spring in a way that has preserved the regime’s
control. The Jordanian military’s role in these developments has
been neglected but is critical to understand, particularly as the United States and its coalition partners continue to deal with violent extremist threats in the region.

S

ince early 2011, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has weathered a number of political challenges inspired by the Arab
Spring. Analysts agree the regime has navigated the demands of
its population in a way that has preserved its control.1 Although on the
surface, the Jordanian establishment has much less to fear from the Arab
Spring in terms of its long-term power, there are important challenges
the monarchy must address in the coming years.
The Jordanian military’s role in these developments has often been
neglected, despite its increasing importance as a crucial component of
the ruling political coalition. Most academic work on the subject of the
Jordanian armed forces has merely assumed the institution’s acquiescence to any political change approved by the king. As such, the army
is characterized as being professional and, so far, dependable.2 This
characterization ignores the occasionally tumultuous relationship the
military has had with past monarchs and the recent strain between
military officials and the ruling family, which points to fissures in the
dependability of the armed forces.
In any given society, the military is one of the most powerful institutions, even when under the control of civilian officials. Particularly in
the Middle East, the military has been identified as a key institutional
player regardless regime, in the setting and execution of government
policy.3 Military forces have also played a central role in deciding the
outcomes of protest movements and revolutions in countries affected
by the Arab Spring.4 As such, and particularly in the case of Jordan—a
monarchy dependent on a tribally-dominated military to maintain its
rule—an analysis of the army is crucial to understanding future political
developments.
Using an institutionalist approach, this article utilizes indicators of
civil-military relations to outline the army’s position in Jordan today.
1     Zoltan Barany, “Unrest and State Response in Arab Monarchies,” Mediterranean Quarterly 24
(2013): 5-38.
2      Ibid, 90-91.
3      Barry Rubin, “The Military in Contemporary Middle East Politics,” in Armed Forces in the Middle
East: Politics and Strategy, Barry Rubin and Thomas Keany, eds. (London: Routledge, 2002).
4      Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces
and Society 39 (2012): 44.
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It explores the military’s unique relationship to the Hashemite monarchy, and its evolution since the creation of Jordan in 1946. While
the Jordanian military establishment has so far been similar to those
of other modern monarchies—playing a key role in both containing
political turmoil and maintaining an acceptable pace of reforms—its
increasing self-awareness and pursuit of its corporate interests threaten
to challenge the monarchy’s grip on the institution overall.

Historical Development

Scholars utilizing the institutionalist approach highlight critical
junctures that bind actors in certain arrangements, with greater effects
as time passes.5 To understand contemporary Jordanian civil-military
relations, it is important to examine the historical development of
the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and identify the critical junctures
responsible for its evolution.
The JAF emerged from the Arab Legion, an institution under
British command, passed to the command of King Abdullah I in 1949.6
The king was from a different region, and had blatantly coordinated
with the British in the 1948 war. Subsequently, the ruling family lacked
the “civic-myth” responsible for its legitimacy.7 For this reason, the rule
of King Abdullah I came to an abrupt end with his assassination in 1951.
King Abdullah’s grandson, Hussain, ascended the throne in 1952.
In the same year, the Free Officers movement seized power in Egypt,
and Arab nationalist ideology began to sweep the region. King Hussain
gained intelligence that there were many nationalistic officers sympathetic to challenging his rule, and a coup was attempted a year later
by officers emulating the Egyptian example. Luckily, the institutional
legacy of British recruitment (of predominantly Bedouin soldiers) saved
Hussain from removal, as “soldiers chose their king over their officers
in 1957.”8
The king’s reactions following this initial coup attempt constitutes
the first critical juncture in the development of the JAF. Hussain purged
officers suspected of sympathizing with the nationalists. He reconstituted his cabinet with loyalist members only, removing members of
Palestinian origin.9 From that point forward, the king pursued policies
of patronage to the tribes and Bedouins termed “East Bankers” at the
expense of increased Palestinian marginalization. The king also made
clear his stance on the politicization issue: the armed forces were to
remain separate from politics. King Hussain remained suspicious of the
officer corps and the possibility of coups, and maintained the legal separation between members of the armed forces and political expression.10
With the onset of Black September in 1970, Palestinians with
Jordanian citizenship were marginalized entirely. In this conflict, the

5     Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,”
Political Studies 44 (1996): 936-957.
6     Michael Herb, All in the Family (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).
7     Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle
East,” Political Science Quarterly 115 (2000).
8     Herb, All in the Family, 226.
9     Alan George, Jordan: Living in the Crossfire (New York: Zed Books, 2005), 31.
10     Kamrava, “Military Professionalization,” 90.
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armed forces saw large-scale desertions by Jordanians of Palestinian
descent.11 The attempted coup, led by factions of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, can be considered another critical juncture in
the relationship of the monarchy with the armed forces. Despite some
evidence to suggest that Jordanians of Palestinian origin constitute twothirds of the entire Jordanian population, King Hussain and government
leaders pursued a consistent policy of limiting their role in the armed
forces. Estimates place the proportion of Jordanian Palestinians in the
officer corps at only ten percent.12 Additionally, the king relied heavily
on Jordanian tribes for any important military appointment, striking a
balance that worked to increase their ties to the regime.13
Although King Hussain consolidated his control, some groups within
his coalition did not firmly support the regime. Often, groups within the
monarchy’s fold viewed Hashemite policies as “divide and rule,” rather
than any sort of “pluralist inclusion.”14 Each tribe supported by the king
believes it is getting less patronage than others. Consequently, the continued support of the armed forces, despite “extensive royal patronage,”
should not be considered a certainty.15 However, both the patronage
offered by the monarchy and the “de-Palestinianization” of the armed
forces have increased the military’s loyalty to Hashemite rule, as well as
its political support of Jordanian nationalism.16
The military, particularly its leadership, should be considered a
crucial part of the elite coalition.17 Its relationship to the monarchy is
an intimate one, beyond that of a patron and beneficiary. Hussain was
himself a military man, and Abdullah II, like his father, was involved in
the military and came to power with its measured support. Specifically,
he had to assure the dying Hussain, and by extension the military, that
his half-brother Prince Hamzah would be the crown prince. Hamzah
was beloved by the military, and his removal from this position in 2004
marked the beginning of tension between Abdullah and his royalist supporters, both within the tribes and their representatives in the
military.18 The king was also in the process of consolidating his power
in the economic sphere through neoliberal measures, but his reforms
began to benefit Palestinians in the private sector rather than the tribes.
Consequently, tribal leaders in supposedly loyal towns and regions
began to protest in support of Hamzah’s return to power as king.19 The
11     Nawaf Tell, “Jordanian Security Sector Governance: Between Theory and Practice,” paper
presented at Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Middle East workshop (Geneva 12-13, 12-13 July
2004), 17.
12     “Jordan Personnel: Composition, Recruitment, and Training,” Federal Research Division of the
Library of Congress, Country Studies Series, 1989.
13     Curtis R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2002), 10, 88.
14     Ibid, 89.
15     Dr. Zoltan Barany, Transcript of Interview (Al-Urdun al Jadid Research Center, April 23,
2012).
16     Tell, “Jordanian Security,” 17.
17     Beatriz Magaloni, “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule,”
Comparative Political Studies 4/5 (2008): 715-741.
18     “Jordan Crown Prince Loses Title,” BBC News, last modified November 2004, “Jordan Crown
Prince Loses Title,” BBC News, “Jordan’s King Names Son, 15, as Crown Prince,” Reuters, last modified July 2009.
19     David D. Kirkpatrick, “Jordan Protestors Dream of Shift to King’s Brother,” The NY Times,
last modified Nov. 21, 2012.
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ultimate outcome of these cleavages within Jordanian society remains
unclear.

Indicators

Scholars have often employed variables, such as professionalization
and representativeness of the army, to assess civil-military relations in
the Middle East. Indicators of professionalization include the clarity
of the chain of command, the cohesiveness of the military’s mission,
and the politicization of the armed forces. As for the civilianization/
representativeness of the armed forces, indicators include type of army
and the military’s domestic role.20
A cursory look at listed commanders or chiefs of staff within each
service indicates most leadership positions are filled by a member of a
prominent East Bank family or tribe (for example, the Al-Zabens, the
Habashnehs, etc.), appointed by the king himself. This is a patrimonial trait of the Jordanian Armed Forces, as is the marginalization of
Palestinian Jordanians.

Professionalization

According to the Constitution, the king and his Council of
Ministers are responsible for internal and external security. The chain
of command between the armed forces and the state flows through this
council. Although technically, the Parliament has oversight over the
Council of Ministers, this council is appointed by the king and all final
decisionmaking is under his authority.21
The king is considered Supreme Commander of the armed forces,
and has generally sought to complicate the chain of command between
the military and the state beyond this title. The Prime Minister has historically delegated the responsibilities of Defense Minister to his Chief
of Staff. The Chief of Staff is nominated by the Prime Minister, but
approved by the king, and accountable to him only.22 Thus, the king’s
power over all defense matters is wide ranging.
Although within each service branch of the armed forces, the chain
of command is relatively clear and conventional, the chain of command
between the armed forces and the state is obfuscated by the role of the
king. Essentially, the monarch makes the Council of Ministers play a
secondary role in decision-making and policy creation. The Defense/
Prime Minister has no oversight over Chiefs of Staff or Directors of
different service branches. The only instances where the Prime Minister
has had any effect on the security sector, JAF included, are when the
Prime Minister had a background of security service or had personal
connections with heads of the service branches.23 This is not a formal
20     Yezid Sayigh, “Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011), 404. The JAF is organized in five main service branches. The
Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are the main divisions. The JAF also features the Jordan Royal
Guard for the personal protection of the king and his family. Finally, the armed forces contain the
Joint Special Operations Command (established in 1963). The creation of the Gendarmerie reflects
an increased militarization of internal security, since the Department of Public Security (that is,
the police) and the General Intelligence Department both emerged from the JAF and prominently
feature paramilitary forces
21     Tell, “Jordanian Security,” 18.
22     Ibid.
23     Ibid, 18.
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institutional arrangement, and thus is an unreliable check on the king or
security sector’s power.
The Constitution has theoretically allocated some means of control
for the Parliament over the military, but the legislature does not have
any security committee. Thereby, it lacks civilian expertise or direct
oversight. The budget of the armed forces is passed through Parliament,
but legislators are not allowed to examine how any sum is to be spent.
In some instances, the budget is not passed through Parliament at all
(namely, any budget having to do with intelligence). Reliance on foreign
aid helps the armed forces remain autonomous from any constitutionally
mandated oversight.24
The Council of Ministers is accountable to the Parliament but this
arrangement amounts to very little oversight since the ministers themselves have always delegated important decisionmaking power to their
chiefs of staff. In the rare event the king convenes a National Security
Council meeting to address security issues, legislators are not on the list
of contributing members. Instead, the king often seeks the opinions of
relevant ministers, chiefs of staff, and commanders of particular service
branches. Abdullah, like his predecessors, has maintained his right to
convene this group and fill its seats with whomever he deems fit.25

Civilianization

Jordan abolished the draft in 1992, and has since featured an allvolunteer army. The implication of a conscript army is that it is highly
representative of society, barring any racist or separatist laws that limit
certain segments of society from involvement in the military. With an
all-volunteer army however, one must assess the backgrounds of those
most likely to serve and analyze the state’s recruitment policies (in terms
of their target citizen) to assess representativeness.
Following the monarchy’s purge of politicized members and those
of questionable loyalty (in many cases, Palestinians), from the armed
forces, recruitment for the military focused on East Bank tribes and
Bedouins (though some ethnic minorities have also been incorporated).26
Clearly, the ruling family adopted a specific strategy to maintain a mostly
East Bank military to consolidate power and directly allocate patronage
benefits through the state to royalist citizens. This may not be a sustainable policy in the future, however, since demographic changes among
Jordanian citizens may force the monarchy to allow Palestinians within
the higher echelons of the military.27 The loyalty of the armed forces to
their king is not unquestionable, but safe to assume for the present.

Internal Role

The domestic function of the JAF has always been to protect the
regime; specifically, the ruling family. The monarchy has often deployed
the armed forces against real or perceived internal enemies (for example,
factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization or political dissidents).

24     Ibid.
25     Ibid.
26     Herb, All in the Family; Ryan, Jordan in Transition.
27     Alexander Bligh, “The Jordanian Army: Between Domestic and External Challenges,” Middle
East Review of International Affairs 5. No. 2 (June 2001):13-20.
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Some analysts make the claim internal policing is the primary function
of the military, despite stated intentions.28 Examining the capabilities of
the military, it is clear Jordan is ill-equipped to fight any external war, yet
spends increasing amounts of revenue on the Joint Special Operations
Forces and newly created Gendarmerie—both of which focus on internal counterterrorism and stability. Therefore, this claim has merit.
The JAF also serve the internal role of upholding Jordanian
nationalism, particularly against Palestinians as citizens of questionable
loyalty.29 The military exists first to be loyal to the king, embodying the
tangibility of the Jordanian national state. This fits in with the concept
of the nation-building monarchy, in which the king serves as a linchpin above a multitude of tribal and regional cleavages. In this manner,
the monarch can co-opt potential challengers by incorporating certain
societal groups within the coalition and excluding others.30 The ruling
family serves as the “thread that holds a divided country together.”31 In
Jordan, this strategy is clearly reflected in the army’s composition. It has
a positive relationship with certain segments of society, but the proper
“civilianization” of the JAF is questionable and has the effect of souring
civil-military relations.

Civil-Military Relations Under Pressure
Instability

Recent uses of the military in internal affairs occurred following
the Arab Spring in protests concerning electoral reform, neoliberalist
policies, and charges of corruption.32 The police forces served their
purposes for a time, though the spread of protests in commonly loyal
cities worried the monarch. As a result, the gendarmerie was put to good
use.33 This paramilitary force has been involved in quashing protests,
even in gatherings predominantly filled with “East Bankers.”34 There is
no reason to believe the remaining service branches would not follow
suit if necessary.35 After all, with some semblance of professionalization
comes a subordination to the regime, and the military has no shortage
of experience in maintaining domestic stability, as its history proves.
However, some questions remain as to whether East Bankers, perceiving marginalization, will deploy to protect the monarchy in such a
loyal fashion.36 Grievances recently expressed both by military veterans,
and the tribes they come from, indicate a gradual shift in the political
28     Ibid.
29     Ibid.
30     Lisa Anderson, “Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive,” in Middle East
Monarchies, ed. Joseph Kostiner (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
31     Zoltan Barany, “Unrest and State Response in Arab Monarchies,” Mediterranean Quarterly 24
(2013): 12.
32     Bruce Riedel, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” The Daily Beast, November 15, 2012.
33     Yezid Sayigh, “Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 43 (2011).
34    Achim Vogt, “Jordan’s Eternal Promise of Reform,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4
(2011).
35     Sean L. Yom, “Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Regime Stability,” Combating Terrorism Center,
January 14, 2013.
36     Ibid; Daoud Kuttab (Director General of Community Media Network), transcript of interview by Dr. Zoltan Barany, April 24, 2012.
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landscape of Jordan.37 More importantly, it may point to some fissures
within the armed forces themselves.

Political Reform

While outright mutiny may be out of the question for Jordan’s armed
forces, some questions have been raised over whether the army will get
involved in the debate on political reform, or continue to acquiesce
to the king’s pace. In May 2010, a petition was raised by the National
Committee of Military Veterans calling for an end to corruption, a resolution to the “Palestinian” question within Jordan’s borders, and changes
to the constitution to the benefit of parliamentary power by limiting the
monarch’s role.38 This organization has significant political power, with
over 140,000 ex-soldier members and high-ranking generals from the
most prominent tribes.39 Some analysts considered this move by military
veterans, and their broad scope of demands (political and economic), as
a “culmination of a gradual process in recent years, whereby senior army
veterans interfere in politics.”40
This act suggested to many the military was not a silent actor in the
political arena. In fact, some demands of veterans flirted with attacking
the monarchy itself. The petition emphasized the corruption around
the queen and demanded an end to “elite treachery.”41 Some tribes went
so far as to insist on the ascension of Prince Hamzah to the throne.42
Protests which developed in loyalist regions, involving tribes affiliated
with the armed forces, panicked the monarchy. It seemed a clear case of
dissent “coming from the senior ranks of the military” and “trickling
down” to entire towns and regions.43
The “Hirak” movement emerging out of royalist towns has been
highly vocal about maintaining the East Bank character of the state,
income inequality between rural and (mostly Palestinian) urban areas,
and electoral reform.44 Members of these tribes represent military
officials at all levels, and there is no reason to believe tribe members
within the armed forces do not share the same concerns, in spite of
the patronage benefits they receive from the regime. Corruption within
state bureaucracies, and within the monarchy’s inner circle, has sent
negative signals to the military establishment.45 Neoliberal reforms have
worked to privatize and reduce public resources and expenditures, again
affecting public servants such as soldiers and officers to a great extent.46
Despite the doling out of material benefits at any sign of unrest, it seems
the military leadership recognizes the increasingly powerful role it plays
in determining the country’s political future.
37     Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, March 18, 2013.;
David Schenker, “Will Jordan be the First Arab Monarchy to Fall?” The Atlantic, January 8, 2013.
38     Assaf David, “The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans,” Foreign Policy, June 16, 2010.
39     Vogt, “Jordan’s Eternal Promise of Reform”; Dr. Zoltan Barany, transcript of interview with
Steven Tucker (USAID), April 24, 2012.
40     David, “The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans.”
41     Vogt, “Jordan’s Eternal Promise of Reform.”
42      Kirkpatrick, “Jordan Protestors Dream.”
43     David, “The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans.”
44     Schenker, “Will Jordan be the First Arab Monarchy to Fall?”
45     Marwan Muasher, “Reform in Jordan: After the Vote,” The Global Think Tank, Carnegie
Endowment, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/28/reform-in-jordan-after-vote/f6fg.
46     Vogt, “Jordan’s Eternal Promise of Reform.”

54

Parameters 44(3) Autumn 2014

Neglecting the military’s grievances may prove detrimental to the
monarch’s long-term control. Without the loyalty of the JAF, the threat
that some tribes might “follow Tunisia and Egypt” poses great risk to
King Abdullah personally, and to the future of his line.47

Conclusions

Jordan has formal institutions governing politics, and in particular
civil-military relations, but the monarch’s increasing involvement has led
to institutional decay. Nevertheless, the JAF have been recognized as
highly institutionalized in comparison to other armies in the region. The
Jordanian military is politicized, but the armed forces still feature a conventional chain of command internally. There is little civilian oversight
with regard to their affairs and budgets, however, which suggests civilian control could be strengthened. Additionally, the marginalization of
most Palestinian Jordanian citizens harms the level to which the armed
forces are representative of society. Combined with the consistent use
of the military in internal conflict, these traits allude to the possibility
of strain between society and the armed forces. Despite continued subordination to the monarch, recent tensions arising from the military’s
perceived marginalization may exacerbate the politicization of JAF, and
create a possible opening for their intervention in politics.

Implications for US Policy

Formal institutions, particularly as outlined by the Jordanian
Constitution, have the capacity to function in such a way to allow for the
role of the king, but also give the military establishment space to develop
professionally. The first step to reforming civil-military relations would
be to strengthen formal institutions.48 The United States can play a role
in encouraging balanced civil-military relations through the use of conditional military aid, as well as continued joint military relationships.
Since Jordan is a key ally in the region, this objective should be a priority.
Secondly, the JAF has expressed grievances as a result of privatization programs and alleged corruption. Although the military receives
aid from external sources (namely, US aid makes up approximately 46
percent of the entire budget), it remains woefully behind in a number
of crucial areas.49 External defense capabilities are lacking, and expenditures appear focused on internal counterterrorism forces. Reprioritizing
the military’s expenses would reorient their mission, and transition any
harmful internally focused role to the role of a modern military.50 This
is yet another area in which the United States can have a direct positive
effect by increasing conditional aid and military-to-military cooperation.
However, this should not necessarily imply the need for deployment
of American forces on the ground. Recent events in Syria have threatened Jordanian borders, pushing King Abdullah to request a limited US
military presence to support “the security of Jordan.” And indeed, 900
American military members are now stationed within the country, in
47     Ibid, 67.
48     Tell, “Jordanian Security.”
49     William Parsons and William Taylor, “Arbiters of Social Unrest: Military Responses
to the Arab Spring,” US Army Military Academy at West Point (2011), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?AD=ADA562816.
50     Bligh, “The Jordanian Army;” David, “The Revolt of Jordan’s Military Veterans.”

Confronting the “Islamic State”

El Kurd

55

addition to an assault ship off the coast. This move has only served to
exacerbate the grievances of agitated parties within the Jordanian polity,
rather than bolster the stability of the regime. For instance, tribal leaders
have expressed discontent at the presence of foreign forces within Jordan,
and have even characterized the military personnel as a legitimate target
of attack. Secular and Islamist groups have registered outrage and added
it to their list of criticisms against the state.51 Clearly, such a move only
weakens the king and his legitimacy, and despite American interests in
both Jordanian security and the Syrian-Iraq crisis, American policymakers would do well to step lightly.
Programs like military exercise “Eager Lion,” on the other hand,
are an appropriate level of involvement. This annual military exercise
began in 2011 and encompasses Jordanian, American, and assorted
Arab troops from around the region.52 Not only does such an exercise
help strengthen military-to-military ties between Jordan and the United
States, it can be publicized to the Jordanian public as an effective way to
fortify the Jordanian army during a time of increased security threats.
Additionally, programs such as “Eager Lion” help to stabilize the region
in the sense that such exercises foster ties amongst neighbors and pave
the way for further military cooperation between Arab countries in the
future. This issue is becoming progressively more important, as the
conflict in Syria spills over to its increasingly fragile neighbors burdened
by domestic issues and an influx of refugees. Thus, renewal of this particular exercise, and the development of more opportunities of this kind,
would be highly useful for American purposes.
All in all, with political turmoil far from over in the Arab world, and
on-going in Jordan, understanding the actions of significant actors such
as the JAF continues to be the most important task.

51     David Schenker, “What Have US Troops Been Doing in Jordan?” [CNN Global Public
Square blog]. (July 12, 2013).
52     Rachel Badgeley and Zach Mott, Exercise Eager Lion Begins in Jordan, http://www.army.mil/
article/105272/Exercise_Eager_Lion_begins_in_Jordan/.

